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ABSTRACT
We investigate how the widespread absence of signatures in DNS (Domain Name System) delegations, in
combination with a common misunderstanding with regards to the DNS specification, has led to insecure
deployments of authoritative DNS servers which allow for hijacking of subdomains without the domain owner’s
consent. This, in turn, enables the attacker to perform effective man-in-the-middle attacks on the victim’s online
services, including TLS (Transport Layer Security) secured connections, without having to touch the victim’s DNS
zone or leaving a trace on the machine providing the compromised service, such as the web or mail server. Following
the practice of responsible disclosure, we present examples of such insecure deployments and suggest remedies for
the problem. Most prominently, DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) can be used to turn the
problem from an integrity breach into a denial-of-service issue, while more thorough user management resolves the
issue completely.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Before a connection to a named Internet host (e. g.
www.fu-berlin.de) can be established, it is necessary to
determine the IP address associated with the host name.
This lookup is done using the Domain Name System
(DNS) which for this reason underlies almost every
Internet connection today. The lookup process itself,
however, is rather complicated in practice, as the DNS
is a decentralized storage system with many independent
parties maintaining authoritative information for disjunct
subtrees (“zones”) within the global name space, and
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with a myriad of Internet access providers maintaining
their own caches. Thus, the correct operation of an
authoritative DNS service is a non-trivial task.
Furthermore, while being initially intended and still
primarily used for IP lookups, the DNS has been seeing
growing use for other domain-related purposes [10]. A
common use case is requesting a TLS certificate as
is necessary in order to provide trustworthy transport
security for a web or mail server running on that
particular named host. The certificate is tied to the host
name, and in order to establish trust, proof of ownership
of that name is required before a certificate will be
issued. There are various mechanisms to prove domain
ownership one of which is to provide a challenge in the
DNS zone containing the domain in question [14]. Other
use cases include anti-spam policies, certificate pinning,
and key exchange mechanisms [4].
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With the DNS playing such a crucial role in the
orderly functioning of the Internet, it is important that
the integrity of DNS information be ensured. Failing
that, communication partners cannot trust even the most
basic expected properties of online communication, such
as talking to the intended recipient.
2 RELATED WORK
Having originally been designed as an unauthenticated
plaintext protocol, the DNS has offered numerous
opportunities for interception and manipulation since its
inception [3]. In particular, an attacker who is in control
of the transport layer —such as a Wifi operator— can
replace DNS response packets at will, leading the client
computer to accept spoofed information. DNS response
spoofing can be achieved even if the attacker cannot
intercept and drop the original packet, provided that the
fake packet can be injected such that it arrives at the
client before the original packet [21].
Clients usually do not query an authoritative DNS
server directly. Instead, queries are channeled through
“resolver” servers that try to answer the question based
on cached information, and only perform full DNS
resolution if the answer to the question is unknown
or has expired. When performed between the DNS
resolver and the authoritative server, the attack described
in the previous paragraph can be used to poison resolver
caches. Forging the expiration time permits long-term
cache poisoning [20].
Other DNS abuse scenarios include sending queries
with fake IP addresses in the UDP header such that the
response, often considerably larger than the question, is
directed to the specified third party. Especially when
performed in a distributed manner, such large-scale
amplification attacks quickly lead to resource depletion
or bandwidth exhaustion at the receiver, followed by
denial of service [1].
Further, DNS integrity can be compromised by
inducing irregular behavior in other infrastructure
components whose correct operation is taken for
granted by DNS resolvers. Only recently, a large
DNS service provider suffered from forged BGP route
announcements, leading to the redirection of DNS
queries to attacker-controlled servers, enabling them to
take control of all zones managed by the provider’s DNS
servers [19, 24].
A similar idea is to take possession of expired domain
names which are referenced elsewhere in a security-
related context, so that the attacker can act stealthily on
the victim’s behalf [15, 11].
Various remedies have been proposed to deal with
the issues described above, including source port
root
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Figure 1: Tree structure of the DNS
randomization (against cache poisoning), digital signing
of DNS information using the Domain Name System
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) (against spoofing), BGP
signing (against routing attacks), and DNS transport
encryption using TLS (against interception) [8, 2, 9, 23,
7].
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 DNS Zones vs. Domain Names
The DNS organizes name-related information using a
tree structure whose root is managed centrally by so-
called DNS root servers (see Fig. 1). By means of DNS
delegation records, responsibility for parts of the tree
can be transferred to other DNS servers. On the root
level, this usually means that responsibility for top-level
subtrees such as .de is delegated to an independent entity
(e. g. DENIC, the .de registry).
The delegation cascade starts at the root level and
defines the responsibility for each subtree. A server
at the end of the delegation chain is said to be an
authoritative DNS server.
In DNS terminology, delegated subtrees are called
“zones”. Each zone corresponds to a distinct data
structure on the responsible authoritative DNS server
containing DNS records for the names which are part
of the zone. For example, the zone fu-berlin.de may
contain an IP address for this name, but also additional
records for other names such as www.fu-berlin.de. Note
that the latter name is part of the fu-berlin.de zone unless
a delegation record exists for it. Only by the delegation
record’s presence, the associated subtree is turned into a
zone on its own. The root of a zone is also called the
“zone apex”.
Valid node (and leaf) names of the name space tree are
called domain names. (Validity requirements primarily
pertain to length and character set restrictions.) A zone
thus may contain information both for the domain name
representing the apex and for domain names that have
additional prefixes (“subdomains”). Likewise, for a
given domain name, there is not necessarily a zone of
the same name, as the domain may be a subdomain of
the domain at the zone apex.
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3.2 DNS Resolution
The process of obtaining pieces of information from
the DNS is called DNS resolution. It consists of two
steps [12]:
1. The client sends a query to a DNS server. The
query specifies the domain name (QNAME) and the
record type (QTYPE) of interest. Additional flags
may be set for extra control over the resolution.
2. The server sends a response to the client. If the
desired information was retrieved without error,
it is encoded in the response along with various
metadata; otherwise, response codes signify the
error condition.
Servers can be configured to recursively resolve DNS
queries if they find themselves not to be authoritative for
the queried QNAME. In this case, the resolution process
will follow the delegation chain so that the query will
eventually reach an authoritative server. (This assumes
that the query has the “recursion desired” flag set.)
RFC 1034 Sec. 4.3.2 specifies the algorithm by which
DNS resolution is performed [12]. In particular, it
defines how a server determines which data structure to
use for assembling the response. Specifically, the server
will
search the available zones for the zone which
is the nearest ancestor to QNAME. If such a
zone is found, go to step 3 [...]
where “step 3” details how to fetch the information
associated with the requested QTYPE from the data
structure representing the zone that was found.
Note that this part of the algorithm contains a conflict
resolution mechanism for the case of ambiguous zone
information being present on the server: By referring
to the nearest ancestor, the algorithm prescribes that if
the server has two (or more) distinct zones configured
spanning QNAME —such that one apex domain presents
itself as a subdomain of the other—, the information
stored in the subdomain zone (“subzone”) is decisive for
answering the query. Any information that the parent
zone may have stored for the same QNAME must not be
used in the response.
To better appreciate this algorithmic choice, it is worth
illustrating the decision context a bit further. First of all,
note that the mechanism is consistent with the notion that
the parent zone is no longer authoritative for a subtree
that has been delegated someplace else. Still, when both
zones are configured on the same server, the nearest
ancestor rule applies regardless of the presence of a
delegation record in the parent zone. In fact, no check
for a delegation record in the parent zone is performed.
Such a check though would actually be spurious: As
the server only knows the contents of its own zones,
it does not know whether there exists a continuous
delegation chain from the root zone to the parent zone
in question, and therefore it cannot assume that it is
authoritative for the parent zone. As a consequence,
it would be ill-founded to honor any delegation (or
other) records in the parent zone without starting
another recursive resolution process in order to validate
the delegation chain. Recursive resolution, however,
adding significant latency and requiring an uplink
Internet connection, is considered out of scope for an
authoritative DNS server.
4 SUBDOMAIN HIJACKING ATTACK
4.1 Scheme
The nearest ancestor rule described in the previous
section dictates that if an attacker successfully configures
a zone whose apex is a subdomain of another zone that is
configured on the same server, the server will exclusively
use information from the attacker-controlled subzone
when answering queries for QNAMEs covered by that
subzone. If the server is also authoritative for the parent
zone, this allows the attacker to exert full control over
the public DNS subtree corresponding to that subzone.
The following conditions are sufficient for an attacker
to take control of a subdomain:
1. The user management policies of the DNS server
operator allow the creation of zones even if there is
a parent zone defined on the same server but owned
by a different user.
2. The server is authoritative for that parent zone.
Under these circumstances, a malicious user can
launch a subdomain hijacking attack against zones
owned by other users. The result of the attack is
equivalent to delegating the hijacked subdomain away
from the parent zone, without however having to create
a delegation record within the parent zone.
4.2 Analysis
The attack brings about several dangerous consequences:
Traffic redirection: Typically, zones contain records
with IP addresses for prominent subdomains such
a www. With full control over arbitrary subzones,
the attacker can easily redirect traffic to an attacker-
controlled machine by creating A or AAAA records
containing IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, respectively.
Similarly, a man-in-the-middle attack can be
conducted against email traffic by creating an MX
record.
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Full-nameserver hijacking: As an extension of the
preceding point, a particularly peculiar situation
arises if the names of the authoritative nameservers
(as listed in the parent zone’s delegation records)
are subdomains of a zone that is hosted on
those same nameservers. This is in fact often
the case, a typical examples being the zone
example.com having NS records ns1.example.com
and ns2.example.com in the parent zone com.
In this case, an attacker who successfully creates
subzones for those names can set A and AAAA
records for the nameserver subdomains and thus —
under reasonable assumptions1— intercept general
nameserver traffic, hijacking zones and replacing
their contents at will. This scenario does not only
allow for manipulation of subzones, but also of
entire zones owned by different users.
Furthermore, this situation allows the attacker to
monitor and analyze traffic that is intended to arrive
at the hijacked nameservers, enabling the attacker to
learn about and potentially compromise other parts
of the DNS provider’s infrastructure.
TLS certificate forgery: By means of the ACME DNS
challenge method, domain owners can request TLS
certificates and prove domain ownership by placing
a challenge inside a TXT record at the acme-
challenge subdomain [14]. With control over
all subdomains, an attacker can not only obtain
forged TLS certificates for subdomains like www
(challenge record at acme-challenge.www), but
also for the parent zone apex, as the ownership
proof only involves the acme-challenge subdomain
and not the apex itself. Having obtained a valid
certificate, the attacker can extend the previously
described man-in-the-middle attack to encrypted
connections.
Both traffic redirection as well as certificate forgery
are achieved without touching or leaving any trace on
the servers whose services are being compromised (e. g.
1 In the case at hand (with the nameserver names being part of
the zone itself), a correctly configured parent zone (e. g. com)
will have so-called glue records defined. These records, albeit
unauthoritative, point resolvers to the nameservers’ IP addresses.
Without such glue records, resolvers would be stuck in a chicken-
and-egg problem when trying to resolve, for instance, example.com
via ns1.example.com. While glue records themselves are not affected
by the subzone hijacking attack, resolvers may, as suggested by
RFC 2181 Sec. 5.4.1 [6], cross-check glue data with an authoritative
nameserver and honor the records found there, even exclusively
(replacing the cached information extracted from glue records).
As the authoritative data may be part of a hijacked subzone, this
especially diligent behavior enables the possibility to hijack entire
nameservers. Still, in most configurations, it is likely that at least a
small fraction of DNS traffic would still reach the servers specified in
the glue records.
DNS, web, or mail). Moreover, because the attack does
not require the modification of any zone information
(but merely the creation of a subzone), the attacker does
not need to circumvent any access protections that may
be in place for zones configured on the server. As a
result, the attack is very unlikely to set off any alarm
notification systems if performed properly and carefully
(e. g. relaying intercepted traffic on to the intended
recipient).
Further harm can be done if a DNS server operator
automatically adds delegation records to the parent
zone upon creation of a subzone. While a useful
feature for users who create subzones under their own
zones —especially when using DNSSEC which requires
several delegation records in order to establish the
cryptographic chain of trust—, it has a pernicious
effect when employed with bogus subzones, as the
DNSSEC delegation will cryptographically legitimize
the delegation so that resolvers are unable to detect the
attack.
5 AFFECTED DNS SERVICE PROVIDERS
To illustrate that the vulnerability is not merely a
theoretical issue, we attempted to identify a few DNS
service providers affected by the vulnerability. As
we indeed found several vulnerable deployments, we
notified the affected providers and assisted them with
the adoption of appropriate countermeasures (see Sec. 6)
before publication of this result. To our knowledge, the
operators listed below are no longer vulnerable.
The investigations covered 22 providers and were
conducted using two test accounts each, one of which
we used to attempt hijacking a subzone belonging to
the other. To this end, we tried creating DNS records
for the same subdomains in both accounts and, when
that worked, checked whether the the provider’s servers
indeed served the value from the hijacked subzone. As
expected (see Sec. 3.2), this was always the case when
the fraudulent record creation attempt was not rejected.
In case of success, we also checked if the nameservers
were authoritative for their own names, and if so,
attempted hijacking a sister subzone of the nameserver
domain(s). As to not interfere with any existing
configuration, we made sure that these sister names
previously had no DNS records set. All hijacked
subzones were removed after the tests were finished.
We found the following providers to be vulnerable:
Hurricane Electric: This provider runs one of the
largest IPv4 and IPv6 transit networks in the world,
measured by the number of peerings. Nameservers
operated under ns[1..5].he.net host various zones,
including he.net [17]. Other subdomains in this
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zone relate to Hurricane Electric’s global network
infrastructure. DNSSEC is not used. Zones on these
nameservers can be created for free at https:
//dns.he.net/.
We succeeded in hijacking subzones from
other users’ zones. As these nameservers are
authoritative for many high-profile zones which
make attractive targets, this is a significant result.
We also found that a restriction was in effect
for some zones including he.net so that subzone
hijacking was not possible. Without this precaution,
a full-nameserver hijacking attack could have been
performed, the likely effect of which would be a
denial of service condition and/or a compromise
of significant parts of the Hurricane Electric
infrastructure.
GeoScaling: This is a small DNS provider whose
nameservers ns[1..5].geoscaling.com host various
zones belonging to sites worldwide [16]. Until
recently, the geoscaling.com zone itself was
also hosted on these nameservers. DNSSEC is
not used. Accounts can be set up for free on
http://www.geoscaling.com/dns2/.
(We note that the site does not use transport
encryption.)
We succeeded in hijacking subzones from other
accounts. Furthermore, no restriction regarding
the nameserver’s own zone was in place. As the
nameservers in question are no longer authoritative
for the geoscaling.com zone, this is not an issue
any longer. However, while the nameservers
were still authoritative for that zone, we were
able to obtain an illegitimate TLS certificate for
wwww.geoscaling.com, by hijacking the acme-
challenge.wwww subdomain [5]. Other zones
managed by GeoScaling remain vulnerable to TLS
certificate forgery.
It appears that by the same token, it would
have been possible to hijack the nameservers’
subdomains, taking extensive control of
GeoScaling’s DNS operations.
Vautron AG: It hosts a significant number of zones in
Germany [18]. Their nameservers are, amongst
others, ns{1,2}.ns-serve.net ; these are the ones
that were associated with our test accounts. They
are also authoritative for their own hostnames.
DNSSEC is not used, and account setup is not free.
As a domain reselling provider, Vautron does
not allow the creation of arbitrary zones on their
nameservers. Instead, zones are automatically
created and associated with the current user
in the run-up to a domain registration attempt.
Interestingly, having registered the domain
Table 1: DNS providers probed for subzone hijacking
Name self-hosted DNSSEC
vulnerable (yet fixed before publication of this result)
Hurricane Electric yes∗ no
GeoScaling yes† no
Vautron‡ yes no
not vulnerable
Amazon Route 53 GoDaddy
Cloudflare Internet.bs
ClouDNS Key-Systems
deSEC Moniker
DNS Made Easy Name.com
Dynadot Namecheap
Dynu NS1
easyDNS Technologies Rackspace
Enom Safenames
Fabulous.com
∗ explicit protection for zone spanning nameserver domain
† nameserver zone moved to other server after end of study
‡ fixed vulnerability prior to our notice
example.com in one user account, it was
possible to issue a domain registration order
for www.example.com in another account. While
the domain registration would, of course, be
rejected either by the Vautron systems or by the
higher-level registry, the corresponding subzone
was nevertheless created and associated with the
eliciting account. Thus, we succeeded in hijacking
subzones belonging to other accounts.
Several weeks later, we attempted hijacking a
subzone of ns-serve.net, without success. We then
also found ourselves unable to perform the attack
on other domains. It appears that the provider fixed
the issue after more than 12 years, possibly alerted
by the ominous domain registration failures.2
As none of the providers found to be vulnerable
supported DNSSEC, we cannot make any statements
regarding whether the aggravating case of automatic
DNSSEC delegation in combination with the
vulnerability exists in the wild (see Sec. 4.2). We
also probed several other providers and found that they
were not vulnerable to the subzone hijacking attack.
Table 1 gives an overview of the investigated providers.
2 In 2005, one of the authors started using the systems that were now
investigated. The systems had previously been run by Cronon AG, a
subsidiary of Strato AG, and were transferred to Vautron AG in 2010.
With nameservers, IP addresses, web interface, and staff remaining
the same, it appears that the systems overall are the same as before
the changeover.
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6 COUNTERMEASURES
The vulnerability at hand is not merely a matter of
lacking permission checks for access to existing zones.
Rather, the issue is rooted in a misconception prompting
a conceptually faulty user management policy.
In particular, it is not sufficient for the DNS server
operator to impose zone access control restrictions,
for the conflict resolution mechanism of RFC 1034
implicates that the policy must also demand verification
of whether any zone which is about to be created would
fall within the realm of another user’s existing zone.
It is yet worth noting that the problem is not simply
fixed by adding a check for the existence of parent zones
owned by another user: If a DNS server operator naı¨vely
sought to mitigate the hijacking attack in this manner, a
malicious user could create a zone whose apex is one of
the “public suffixes” from which subzones are routinely
delegated to interested parties (such as de or co.uk ),
precluding all other users from setting up their legitimate
subzones under these domains.
The situation actually presents itself as even more
complicated: The list of public suffixes whose
immediate subzones are available for interested third
parties by means of delegation (“domain registration”)
is of considerable size (∼ 8,000 entries) [13]. In
addition to most top-level domains (such as de) and
special-case second-level domains (such as co.uk ),
the list also contains even lower-level domains (such
as s3.amazonaws.com) whose availability for public
registration is not immediately obvious by inspection.
For this reason, and because it is impossible to reliably
identify public suffixes based on their name only, a
centrally maintained Public Suffix List (PSL) [13] has
been established.
With this in mind, it is clear that user management
policy adjustments require a subtler strategy. The proper
approach is to augment the parent zone existence check
with an exception that permits subzone creation if the
immediate parent domain is a public suffix. This
approach requires querying the PSL remotely every time
a zone is created, or maintaining a regularly updated
local copy. Frequent updates are advised as the PSL
changes several times per month.
Another solution consists of implementing the parent
zone check, but allowing subzone creation if the
parent zone contains valid delegation records on its
authoritative server, pointing to the server on which
the subzone is about to be created. In this case,
the delegation could act as an authorization for the
nameserver to create (and later answer queries based
on) the subzone. However, the idea comes with two
disadvantages: First, there is a race condition as a
malicious user could create the subzone betwixt the
delegation record creation and the legitimate user’s
attempt to create the subzone. Secondly, delegation
records would have to be put in place before the subzone
can be populated, potentially causing a downtime for
the names in that subzone. Even after the subzone has
been fully configured, the downtime duration may be
prolonged unexpectedly by caching effects on resolving
servers. The approach can be amended by some sort of
challenge–response protocol, authorizing a specific user
to create the subzone ahead of time; however, such a
protocol is not covered by established DNS standards.
Zone signing is very useful to significantly lower the
impact of subzone hijacking attacks. In particular, when
using DNSSEC to sign DNS records in the parent zone,
resolvers will consider invalid any records that stem from
the attacker’s subzone, for the parent zone does not refer
to the subzone’s public key as would be required for
DNSSEC validation to succeed, and the attacker also
cannot forge signatures using the parent zone’s (private)
key. Thus, the breach of DNS data integrity that is
incurred without zone signing is turned into a denial-
of-service condition by virtue of using DNSSEC. While
not preventing the attack completely, DNSSEC ensures
that its consequences are of a much less severe degree.
(Note that even without DNSSEC, the attack can be used
for denial-of-service purposes, for example by simply
leaving the hijacked subzone empty.)
Another way of mitigating the subzone hijacking
attack, including the denial-of-service scenario, is to
adapt the algorithm in RFC 1034 Sec. 4.3.2 such that
the server performs full DNS resolution in order to
determine whether it is authoritative for the “zone which
is the nearest ancestor to QNAME”, and otherwise
proceed to the next-nearest ancestor zone. As argued in
Sec. 3.2, this would be a major modification to the DNS
resolution procedure, and DNS providers trying to adopt
it would face various operational challenges.
Lastly, we recall that there exist other attacks —
especially those aimed at the transport layer— that open
the door to DNS integrity violations (see Sec. 2). We
would like to point out that DNSSEC, in addition to
controlling the subzone hijacking attack as described
before, is also a suitable antidote against all of those
attacks, regardless of the reliability of the underlying
transport mechanism. It is thus always advisable to
deploy DNSSEC in order to obtain maximum integrity of
DNS data. Formely made counter-arguments, especially
regarding the prohibitive size of DNSSEC signatures,
are no longer substantiated since the advent of elliptic-
curve cryptography [22]. We therefore encourage
DNS operators to seriously consider the deployment of
DNSSEC.
11
Open Journal of Web Technologies (OJWT), Volume 5, Issue 1, 2018
7 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We investigated a serious vulnerability found in some
deployments of authoritative DNS servers that allows
for the hijacking of subdomains. By mounting this
attack, unauthorized parties can perform full-scale man-
in-the-middle attacks on the victim’s online services,
including TLS-secured connections, without touching
the machines providing the compromised services such
as web or email. We described that the origins of
the vulnerability lie in a misconception about the DNS
resolution algorithm defined in RFC 1034, leading to
faulty user management concepts. After presenting
real-world examples of the issue, we suggested
remedies against the problem, including improved user
management policies and the deployment of DNSSEC.
The prevalence of the vulnerability in the global DNS
market remains unknown, and a systematic evaluation
of the DNS service providers operating the most-queried
zones in the world would be an interesting subject of
further research. During our preliminary survey, we
found that due to the inhomogeneity of the ownership
landscape with respect to IP and domain owners as well
as server operators, and due to further complications
such as whitelabeling of nameserver hostnames, the
attribution of domain names to DNS operators is rarely
straightforward. As a result, a systematic prevalence
study is likely to be a rather challenging endeavor.
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